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The background of the current debate 
With the establishment of the Convention on the
Future of Europe on 28 February 2002, the debate
on the principle of subsidiarity for the functioning
of the European Union, and on its application,
entered a new phase.
The Laeken Declaration of December 20011
marked the beginning of a transition insofar as it
reflected concerns expressed by political leaders
over the previous months and set out the basic
guidelines of the debate on the future of Europe.
In this context, three priorities were indicated for
further reflection:
• How to make the division of competences more
transparent.
• How to determine whether there needs to be
any reorganisation of competences.
• How to allow for flexibility in the distribution of
competences.
Interestingly, the need to “ensure that a redefined
division of competences does not lead to a creeping
expansion of the competence of the Union or to
encroachment upon the exclusive areas of compe-
tence of the Member States” was stressed in the
Declaration.This is a clear reflection of the warning
signals sent by a number of leaders,particularly from
the German regional establishment, in the run-up to
Laeken. At the same time, the fundamental linkage
between the question as to ‘who does what’ and “the
nature of the Union’s action and what instruments it
should use” was established.
Prior to the Laeken Declaration, in December 2000,
the Declaration on the Future of the Union adopted
at Nice2 put the question of “how to establish and
monitor a more precise delimitation of competencies
between the European Union and the Member States,
reflecting the principle of subsidiarity.”
Subsidiarity in context
In order to appreciate the main features of the
ongoing debate and the distinctiveness of the polit-
ical and institutional context of the Union, some
preliminary remarks seem useful. To begin with, a
short definition of subsidiarity is necessary to
frame the guidelines of the discussion.
In short, subsidiarity is the principle whereby action
should be taken as close as possible to the citizens,
and left to private actors when the involvement of
public structures is not required to achieve expected
results. Higher levels of governments should inter-
vene only when they can provide tangible added
value in delivering policy outcomes. The essential
trade-off at the core of the subsidiarity debate is
between efficiency and freedom.
This definition needs,however,to be completed with
two further observations. On the one hand, the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity should be regarded not only as
the criterion for the delimitation of competences
between different public (or private) actors but also,
and perhaps most importantly, as a dynamic princi-
ple governing the shift of these competences and
guaranteeing the flexibility of the system. On the
other hand, given the definition outlined above, it
should be stressed that subsidiarity works both ways:
from the top down,but also from the bottom up.This
is particularly relevant when looking at the current
debate at the European level, where the emphasis is
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clearly put on the former dimension, and much less
on the latter.
The principle of subsidiarity plays a fundamental
role in establishing a workable relationship
between different levels of government in any
multi-level framework. While, however, the princi-
ple normally applies to decision-making in federal
states,this is of course not the case when looking at
the European multi-level framework.
The components of the European Union – Mem-
ber States – are far more heterogeneous than the
components of any other federation in the world,
with the possible exception of India.Their number
is rapidly growing with successive waves of
enlargement, and the diversity of interests to be
included in decision-making at EU level is expand-
ing exponentially.
Most of these component units are,in turn,divided
into a number of sub-units – regions, Länder,
comunidades autonomas etc. – with very different
degrees of autonomy. In fact, some of these ‘sub-
national’ entities are endowed with law-making
powers and have elected governments. The so-
called ‘constitutional regions’ are effectively fully-
fledged state-like systems.
Most notably, political or administrative subdivi-
sions in the Member States of the European Union
correspond to deep-rooted distinctive historical
traditions, such as in the case of Germany, or to
national differences tout court, as in the case of
Belgium, Spain and the United Kingdom. In fact, a
considerable number of the calls for more powers
being allocated at the national level actually origi-
nates from the concern of regional entities to pre-
serve their own competences in areas such as edu-
cation or health.These policy areas reflect the dis-
tinctive character of a socio-economic model, and
sub-national entities are reluctant to entrust
Member States’ governments with legislation at
EU level in the Council of Ministers.
In stark contrast to most federal constitutional sys-
tems, the power to allocate competences to the
European level of government – or Kompetenz-
Kompetenz – firmly belongs to Member States. This
is reflected in the so-called principle of attribution of
powers,enshrined in Article 5 TEC.It implies that all
EU powers are not sovereign but derived. Also, the
role reserved to the Union in those areas where nor-
mally federal competence is exclusive, is actually
quite limited. This is the case as far as internal and
external security policies are concerned, but also for
foreign policy more widely.Of course,monetary pol-
icy is managed at the federal level for those countries
belonging to the euro zone.
This leads to a further important consideration,
namely that one very distinctive expression of the
principle of subsidiarity in the context of the
European Union is differentiated integration.
Arguably, the mechanism whereby a group of EU
Member States can undertake ‘enhanced coopera-
tion’ in a given policy area, such as, for example,
armament procurement, reflects the need to allo-
cate the exercise of competences in this field to a
different level of government, better equipped to
act effectively. From this standpoint, therefore,
moves towards differentiated integration in the
Union (whether by way of ‘variable geometry’ or
by shaping a ‘two speed’ Europe) basically result in
allocating competences to intermediate levels of
government between the Member States and the
fully-fledged EU level.
Subsidiarity in the Treaties
Turning to the primary law of the European Com-
munity and of the European Union, the principle
of subsidiarity cannot be considered in isolation
from at least three other important principles
informing the functioning of the EU: transparency,
proportionality and Union loyalty.
According to Article 1 TEU,decisions in the Union
“are taken as openly as possible and as closely as
possible to the citizen.” Two points deserve particu-
lar attention in this respect.
Firstly, transparency and subsidiarity are indicated as
the two sides of the same coin. This is relevant
because one of the most pressing demands in the cur-
rent debate is that responsibilities are clearly allocat-
ed so that citizens can understand ‘who is responsible
for what’. However, some confusion seems to occur
between the very legitimate call for transparent deci-
sion-making, and the instrumental use of subsidiarity
to justify a rigid delimitation of competences.
Secondly, a direct reference is made to the citizens:
this seems to pave the way for an application of
subsidiairty in the functioning of the Union thatgoes beyond the two-level game involving the EU
and Member States, and extends to sub-national
entities. So far, there has been considerable resis-
tance to opening the discussion on the delimitation
of competences to the sub-national level,but inter-
esting developments are taking place in the current
debate at the Convention as to the monitoring of
subsidiarity, as reported below.
Article 5 TEC states that: “In areas which do not
fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action,in accordance with the principle of
subsidiarity, only if and insofar as the objectives of
the proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved
by the Member States and can therefore, by reason
of the scale or effects of the proposed action, be bet-
ter achieved by the Community.”
This provision reflects a more legalistic approach
to the application of the principle of subsidiarity.
Notably, its application is limited to areas that do
not fall within the remit of the exclusive compe-
tence of the Union, and parameters for action are
set down. Interestingly, the reference to ‘exclusive’
competences, whether of the Union or of Member
States, is increasingly challenged as a reliable, and
workable, criterion for delimitation.
The procedural steps to be taken for ensuring that
the subsidiarity dimension is fully acknowledged in
the decision-making process are specified in detail
in the Protocol on the Application of the Principle
of Subsidiarity and Proportionality, attached to the
Treaty of Amsterdam. From this standpoint, the
main innovation in the Convention is the consen-
sus on the involvement of national parliaments in
the monitoring of the application of subsidiairty.
As to the principle of proportionality whereby,
according to Article 5 TEC, “Any action by the
Community shall not go beyond what is necessary to
achieve the objectives of this Treaty”, this is arguably
the real target of much questioning of EU interven-
tion.It is somewhat misleading to challenge the com-
petence of the Union to legislate in a given policy
field,when the actual problem is the degree of detail
of legislation.This is a key point in the debate,and is
central to the question of ‘Complementary compe-
tences’, recently the subject of a report of one of the
Working Groups of the Convention.
Article 10 TEC expresses the principle of Union
loyalty or solidarity, by establishing that “Member
States shall take all appropriate measures…to
ensure the fulfilment of the obligations arising out
of this Treaty or resulting from action taken by the
institutions of the Community. They shall facilitate
the achievement of Community’s tasks. They shall
abstain from any measure which could jeopardise
the attainment of the objectives of this Treaty.”
It should be noted that the inclusion of a clause of
reciprocity, whereby the Union shall respect the
responsibilities and identities of Member States, is
likely to be the outcome of the ongoing debate in
the Convention on this particular subject. This
would go beyond the present wording of Article
6.3 TEU, whereby “The Union shall respect the
national identities of its Member States.”3
Three highways in the Convention
The debate on the principle of subsidiarity and its
implications taking shape in the Convention is essen-
tially threefold, focusing in particular on: the ques-
tion of the delimitation of competences; the link
between competences and instruments; and how to
effectively monitor the respect of subsidiarity.
The delimitation of competences
This important issue is central to the ongoing polit-
ical controversy on the distribution of power
between the Union and Member States, but it
should be made clear that delimitation does not
necessarily result from a correct application of the
principle of subsidiarity. Contrary to what might
appear, the two questions are separate.As indicat-
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ed above, subsidiarity does not imply a rigid delim-
itation of competences: it simply establishes that
the most appropriate level of government shall
take action, with a view to reconciling autonomy
and efficiency. From a procedural standpoint, in
the presence of appropriate mechanisms for ensur-
ing the participation of all interested parties in
decision-making, no division of competences
would be required at all. If this is an extreme solu-
tion in the direction of flexibility, it should be
stressed that establishing watertight catalogues of
competences would go too far the other way.
The divergence between these two extreme solu-
tions and their supporters is essentially a differ-
ence of Weltanschauung as to what the Union is
about. If one believes in a progress towards an
“ever closer Union”, then a ‘functional’ approach
to the allocation of competences would seem the
most appropriate. The Union would be given
objectives, and would be able to adopt necessary
measures to fulfil them, while respecting subsidiar-
ity.4 On the other hand, if one sees clear limits to
EU integration,then competences and instruments
should be very clearly identified, and the Union
should be able to take action only where a precise
legal basis exists.5 As usual, in medio stat virtus.
Given the growing heterogeneity of the Union and
the consequent increasing need to ensure consis-
tency, it is arguable that an excessive delimitation
of competences would be inappropriate. The vast
majority of competences are in fact shared, and
this is true both for those primarily exercised by
the Union, and for those where Member States are
mainly responsible.
This was the position taken by most members of
the Convention at the plenary sessions in April and
May6 However, recent developments seem to indi-
cate the political will to establish a clear demarca-
tion between different categories of competences,
namely defining three levels: exclusive EU compe-
tences, shared and complementary competences.
The elaboration of the last category was the sub-
ject of extensive reflection in the Convention
Working Group chaired by Henning Christopher-
sen.7 The recommendations of this WG, presented
at the plenary session on 8 November, triggered a
very lively debate and met more opposition than
support.
Aside from the general criticism of the idea of
delimitation of competences as such, two main
problems arose in this context:
• The proposed change of name,from ‘complemen-
tary competences’ to ‘supporting measures’,
marks the shift from a sphere of action to a type
of instrument.A large majority of the members of
the Convention felt that this was inappropriate
and confusing. It was also argued that, from a
legal standpoint, what distinguishes complemen-
tary competences from shared ones is simply that
the exercise of the former does not pre-empt the
right of Member States to legislate in future.
• The exclusion of EU legislation from the policy
areas listed in this context – namely employ-
ment, education and vocational training, cul-
ture, public health, trans-European networks,
industry, research and development – led to
much disappointment. It was argued that the
real issue is the ‘intensity’ of EU intervention –
therefore a matter of proportionality and not of
subsidiarity. Some suggested that sufficient pro-
tection of Member States’ competences would
be guaranteed by excluding harmonisation of
national provisions by EU law.
The Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty issued
by the Praesidium of the Convention on 28
October 2002 envisages a delimitation of compe-
tences in three different categories (Article 9 to 12,
Part One), and includes the exclusion of EU legis-
lation in “the areas in which the Union supports and
coordinates action by the Member States.”8
The ‘Feasibility Study’ published by the Commis-
sion on 4 December9 – a fully-fledged constitution-
4 For a position closely reflecting this approach, see the contribu-
tion submitted by the Belgian members of the Convention,
CONV/53/O2, 1” May 2002: “The Union’s powers, which are func-
tional in nature, are simply means whereby it carries out its missions
and achieves its objectives … powers will be defined on the basis of
missions and objectives.”
5 This alternative model is clearly outlined in the Bundesrat
Resolution on the division of competences 1081/01, 20 December
2001, whereby “the principle of limited specific authorisation to act
must be reinforced” and “differentiated indication of the admissible
legal instruments and the ways in which the Community may pursue
its objectives should be given if specific authorisations to act are
granted.”
6 The summaries of all the plenary sessions of the Convention are
available at
http://european-convention.eu.int/sessplen.asp?lang=EN
7 The full set of Working Documents produced by this Working
Group can be found at
http://european-convention.eu.int/dynadoc.asp?lang=EN&
Content=WGV. For the text of the Final Report, see above n. 3.
8 The text of the Preliminary Draft Constitutional Treaty is avail-
able at
http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/sessPlen/00369.en2.PDF.
9 See n. 3 above.al text for the Union – outlines an alternative
model whereby policies are divided in the first part
of the text into principal policies of the Union,
flanking policies and complementary action.This is
a sort of political statement, helpful for citizens to
understand the remit of the European Union and
of Member States in clear and simple terms. Part
Three of the document, dedicated to the descrip-
tion of individual policy areas, sets out a more
detailed break-down of the powers of the Union
and of the instruments available to it,reflecting the
notion of different degrees of ‘intensity’ of EU
action. It should also be noted that the rules envis-
aged for the amendment of the detailed provisions
of Part Three – Policies – are less demanding than
the procedures established for the revision of part
One – Principles.
The link between competences and instruments
The attempt at linking competences to instruments
is a very relevant aspect of the debate.As stated in
one of the notes prepared by the Secretariat of the
Convention as a basis for debate, “The subject of
legal instruments follows on logically from that of
competences: once it has been decided to implement
a competence, it is necessary to decide who can do
it, how, and with what effects.”10
A shift in focus away from the actor responsible
for taking a decision to the most appropriate
instrument for implementing that decision – that is,
from subsidiarity to proportionality – should be
welcomed. Addressing the two questions simulta-
neously shows the close linkage between the two
principles. On the other hand, it is arguable that a
rigid link between a certain type of competence
and a specific instrument would excessively narrow
the margins of EU action.
The concept of ‘intensity’ is pivotal here.A number
of contributions have been submitted listing the
various ‘modes’ of EU intervention. The German
Bundesrat,for example,indicated five categories in
its contribution to the Convention: harmonisation,
mutual recognition, financial support, supplemen-
tary measures and coordination.11 As a result of
the key intervention by Paolo Ponzano of the
European Commission12,the WG on Complement-
ary Competences came out in favour of a more
elaborated scale of EU intervention,with a distinc-
tion between legislative and non-legislative action
and related examples, in its final report. Whether
such “hierarchy of intensity” is to be enshrined in
the future EU constitution or not is a matter for
discussion. However, it is surely the intellectual
backdrop of the hierarchy of instruments recom-
mended in the final report of the WG on
Simplification chaired by Giuliano Amato.13
The debate in this WG was inspired primarily by
the need for simplification. It was felt that simplifi-
cation was a prerequisite for enhancing the demo-
cratic legitimacy of the Union. At the same time,
however, the definition of a limited number of
instruments (and procedures) and the clear identi-
fication of their effects meets the expectations of
those who denounce the obscure character of the
system, and the scope for prevarication that it
entails.Three levels are identified for the adoption
of acts by the Union: legislation, delegation and
implementation. Legislative acts include laws,
framework laws and decisions.Delegated acts are a
new type of instrument whose scope is determined
by the legislative act.They “supplement or develop
the detail of a legislative act or adapt certain ele-
ments of the actual legislative act, always under the
powers defined by the act” and they are adopted in
the form of delegated regulations. Finally, imple-
menting acts, which fall in principle within the
responsibility of Member States, are to be adopted
by the Commission through the system of comitol-
ogy. They consist of implementing regulations or
implementing decisions.
A smaller number of instruments and a new, sim-
pler language should ensure that citizens are in a
position to better understand what is being decid-
ed at the European level, all the more so given the
parallel simplification of decision-making proce-
dures and the widely expected opening to the pub-
lic of the legislative proceedings in the Council of
Ministers.Arguably, there will be fewer complaints
against the ‘Brussels machinery’ and more pres-
sure on national governments and national parlia-
ments.
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WG,see ‘Delimitation of powers:a matter of scale of intervention’,
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also be of a political
nature
As noted above, a different matter is whether a
clearer definition of the instruments should lead to
a detailed association of types of instruments with
the different competences of the Union.According
to the German Bundesrat, “differentiated indica-
tion of the admissible legal instruments and the
ways in which the Community may pursue its objec-
tives should be given if specific authorisations to act
are granted.” Others believe that the most appro-
priate instruments should be decided on a case-by-
case basis.
The former approach might lead to an extremely
complex, and probably very rigid system. That
would not be in line with some of the priorities
emerging in the Convention debate as to the fea-
tures of the new institutional framework. For
example, if one takes a look at defence policy, cur-
rently discussed in one of the Convention WGs, it
would not make much sense to define one – pre-
sumably non-legislative – instrument of EU inter-
vention. On the contrary, at least three areas of
action could be considered: purely military matters
(intergovernmental instruments and procedures);
crisis management (mixed instruments and proce-
dures); armament procurement and R&D (legisla-
tive instruments and community method).
A potential compromise might consist in indicating
in the legal bases of the future constitution,not the
instruments but the ‘modes’ of action, or in exclud-
ing some of them, such as harmonisation.
Monitoring subsidiarity
Before discussing how best to monitor the applica-
tion of subsidiarity, one first needs to determine
whether subsidiarity is a principle of political or
legal nature. While it seems hard to draw a clear
distinction between these two aspects, some mem-
bers of the Convention feel that judicial scrutiny of
subsidiarity would be more appropriate to avoid
political controversy. Decisions by the European
Court of Justice (ECJ) would be clear and moti-
vated, and its legal authority would not be chal-
lenged.14 Others, however, take the view that the
ECJ would run the risk of undue ‘politicisation’,
were it to be involved in reviewing an essentially
political choice.This was the line taken by some of
the experts who contributed to the proceedings of
the WG dedicated to the monitoring of subsidiari-
ty, chaired by Inigo Mendez de Vigo.15
According to the conclusions produced by the WG,
subsidiarity is a principle of “essentially political
nature” and “monitoring of compliance with that
principle should be of an essentially political nature
and take place before the entry into force of the act
in question.” On the basis of that assumption, the
WG sought to avoid complicating decision-making
and shaped a mechanism for preliminary political
control on the part of national parliaments, failing
which the option would be open for recourse to the
Court.
The approach includes three steps:
• Firstly, national parliaments must be more
closely associated throughout the whole of the
legislative process. In particular, the Commis-
sion should address its legislative proposals to
each national parliament at the same time as to
the Council and the European Parliament. The
same is envisaged for the ‘common position’ to
be discussed by the Conciliation Committee in
the context of the co-decision procedure.
• Secondly, an  ex ante political mechanism or
“early warning system” should be established
for identifying infringements of the subsidiarity
principle. Within six weeks from the date on
which a proposal is sent, each national parlia-
ment would have the right to issue a “reasoned
opinion” concerning compliance with the prin-
ciple of subsidiarity. Depending on the number
of opinions submitted,the Commission could be
obliged to re-examine its proposal.
• Thirdly, national parliaments should have access
to an ex post judicial review by the ECJ. With a
view to limiting the scope of this access, the deci-
sion was taken to link the right of appeal to the
Court to the presentation of a reasoned opinion
ex ante. However, this could result in an artificial
incentive to submit opinions in advance with the
sole purpose of preserving the right of recourse to
the Court. Finally, it should be stressed that indi-
14 See in this sense the contribution ‘Subsidiarity must be con-
trolled by a judicial body’, CONV 213/02, 24 July 2002, by Elmar
Brok MEP and Jacques Santer MEP among others.
15 The Working Documents produced by this WG are available at
http://europeanconvention.eu.int/dynadoc.asp?lang=EN&Content
=WGI.The text of the Final Report, CONV 286/02, is available at
http://register.consilium.eu.int/pdf/en/02/cv00/00286en2.pdf. As to
the debate above, see more specifically the contribution by Jean-
Claude Piris, Director general of the Legal Service of the Council
of Ministers,WD 4, at
http://european-convention.eu.int/docs/wd1/1347.pdf, and the oral
contribution by Francis Jacobs, Advocate General at the ECJ, to
the meeting of the WG on 25 June 2002.vidual chambers of bicameral assemblies are enti-
tled to appeal to the Court. That might lead to
interesting developments under domestic politics
in those federal systems where the ‘second cham-
ber’ of the regions (such as the Bundesrat) is
often of a different political colour from the
national government.
The idea has also been advanced that the
Committee of the Regions should be allowed to
appeal to the Court in relation to “proposals which
have been submitted to the Committee of the
Regions for an opinion and about which, in that
opinion,it had expressed objections as regards com-
pliance with subsidiarity.” This is an important
development towards opening policy-making at
the European level to sub-national actors and to
the interests of regions, albeit through the filter of
a consultative body of the Union.
The final report of the WG includes significant ref-
erences to the question of better distribution of
competences and to the simplification of the leg-
islative instruments available to the Union,and the
clarification of their effects. These two strands of
reform,considered above,are considered prerequi-
sites for the proper application and monitoring of
the principle of subsidiarity.
Conclusion
Following this short overview of the debate on the
principle of subsidiarity and its implications for the
functioning of the enlarged Union after 2004, some
political guidelines can be drawn for further reflection.
Broadly speaking,it would be a mistake to insist on
a rigid delimitation of competences between dif-
ferent levels of government within the Union.
European integration is a necessary condition for
achieving high standards of security and prosperity
for European citizens. Following enlargement, it is
arguable that the principle of solidarity will be at
least as relevant to EU strategic decisions as the
principles of subsidiarity and proportionality.
Moreover, European integration is not an end in
itself, but a step towards a better model of global
governance. All things considered, any move
towards stifling EU decision-making by imposing
severe constraints would be a step backwards.
More and not less flexibility will be required from
now on.
The argument whereby European citizens want a
clear allocation of competences to be able to hold
to account those responsible for important deci-
sions is a valid one. However, this is only a partial
solution to a wider problem, namely the obscurity
and complexity of European decision-making.
Opening up the proceedings of the Council of
Ministers when it legislates, as well as simplifying
instruments and procedures, represents a key step
forward in enabling citizens to understand and
judge decisions taken at the European level. With
this in mind, the idea of a somewhat artificial,
detailed distinction between different levels of
powers is neither necessary nor desirable.
The principle of proportionality, whereby the
‘intensity’ of European intervention should not go
beyond what is necessary to achieve expected
results is now firmly anchored in EU decision-
making. As a consequence, framework legislation
is to be preferred wherever possible. That leaves
more room for Member States’ discretion in imple-
mentation, as the Union does not have the
resources to supervise the crucial phase of imple-
mentation.
The implementation of subsidiarity should be
looked at in this context, and not simply as the
question of who legislates. Decisions are shaped ex
ante though extensive consultation (this is the
direction taken by the European Commission with
its White Paper on European Governance), and
require  ex post a joint effort involving various
actors at different levels to ensure proper imple-
mentation. This does not imply that clear limits
should not be set to the undue expansion of Union
intervention in the area of Member States’ compe-
tences. However, the effective cooperation
between all the relevant actors is a much more
faithful application of the principle of subsidiarity
than a regressive, and outdated, separation of com-
petences.
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